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Guilt, Reasonable Doubt and the Reasonable
Woman
Rory K. Little*
From all that appears in this special discussion issue of the Hastings
Law Journal, the 0.1. Simpson double murder trial has made
women angry. Terry Diggs assails "sexual dominion," "the culture of
men," "deadly patriarchy" and "its malevolent notions"; she darkly asserts
that "only the prospect of world peace is less likely" than the Simpson case
aiding the campaign against domestic violence. I Maria Ontiveros decries
the "vilification" during the trial of a female witness, Rosa Lopez, which
affected Ontiveros viscerally; she berates the attorneys for "fail[ing] to take
issues of ... gender ... into account" and closes with an angry warning
to the male prosecutors that next time they might have her in the jury box
instead. 2 Cynthia Lee attacks the "racial jokes and stereotypes" during
the Simpson trial directed at Asian Americans;3 her anger is smoldering,
understated and thus all the more powerful. Finally, Crystal Weston
condemns "the violence that women experience everyday," our "misogynist and indifferent culture," "the values of this sick nation," and Black
"nationalist dispositions" as "especially harmful to Black women."4
Perhaps the common emotive element of these scholarly essays is
unsurprising. There is little in general to like about the Simpson trial; it
has exposed all the ugly "isms" of the criminal justice system (racism,
~men's

* The author is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of California, Hastings
College of the Law. He received his J.D. from Yale Law School, 1982 and B.A. from the
University of Virginia, 1978. The author would like to thank his colleagues Kate Bloch,
John Diamond, and Evan Lee for their comments and assistance. He would also like to
thank Barbara Yook (Hastings '96) and Fran Nowve.
1. Terry Kay Diggs, Liars and Lycanthropes: Cultural Images in People v. Simpson,
6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 157, 161, 159, 163, 158 (1995).
2. Maria L. Ontiveros, Rosa Lopez, David Letterman, Christopher Darden and Me:
Issues of Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in Evaluating Witness Credibility, 6 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 135, 135, 154, 155, (1995).
3. Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Beyond Black and White: Racializing Asian Americans in
a Society Obsessed with 0.1., 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 165, 172 (1995).
4. Crystal H. Weston, Orenthal James Simpson and Gender, Class, and Race: In that
Order, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 223, 225, 230, 230, 229 (1995).
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sexism, capitalism, and "televism "5) in an unprecedentedly public, slowmotion way. Few individuals who are willing to admit they are lawyers
have much good to say even now that the ordeal has ended.
Yet there seems to be more to these authors' anger than simply general
distaste. Is the anger gender influenced? Of course, the lead women
authors express anger about diverse topics: race, ethnicity, cultural
violence and insensitivity, as well as gender. Moreover, these authors cut
across racial and ethnic lines, and their pieces address multifarious aspects
of the criminal justice system. Yet the anger of the women writing in this
discussion issue seems consistently stronger than that expressed by the
men. For example, while Tom Morawetz (the symposium's only male
lead author6) perceptively identifies a number of aspects of the trial as
"disturbing," his critique lacks the personal tone expressed by Diggs, Lee,
Ontiveros, or Weston. 7
The lead women authors also share another commonality besides
anger; each author asserts, assumes, or ignores the gUilt of the defendant. 8
Is this not also unsurprising? If 0.1. Simpson did kill, then his primary
victim9 was not just a woman but also his former spouse, who had
escaped him after years of physical victimization; victimization that the
criminal justice system softens by labeling "domestic violence," and which
Simpson defense attorneys trivialized as "marital discord. "10 Empirical

5. This tone pun is intended to convey all the ills flowing from the live televising of
criminal trials, which many trial lawyers have decried for years but which the general
public has seen largely only in this trial. See generally Rory K. Little, No Cameras in the
Courtroom,42 FED. LAW. 28 (1995).
6. The structure of this issue is that five authors have led off with essays (Diggs, Lee,
Morawetz, Ontiveros, and Weston) and four authors are "responding" in some way
(Boswell, Floyd, Little, and Scallen).
7. Thomas Morawetz, Fantasy, Celebrity and Homicide, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J.
209, 209 (1995). This is by no means intended as a normative evaluation of Morawetz's
essay, which is stimulating and scholarly. The point is solely to contrast the emotive
content of the essays.
8. Weston directly asserts that, "I believe O.J. Simpson is guilty." Weston, supra note
4, at 230. For the other three authors, Simpson's gUilt or innocence is clearly secondary
to the foci of their anger; yet to the extent the articles imply any fmding, it is guilt, not
innocence. E.g., Diggs, supra note 1, at 158 ("assuming arguendo the truth of the
prosecutor's case"). Certainly the authors ignore the central trial issue-whether Simpson
murdered his ex-wife and Ron Goldman. Their anger has led them to issues they find
central. It must be noted that, of course, these essays were written before any verdict was
returned, and the jury returned an acquittal. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL
704381 at *2 (Cal. Super. Trans. Oct. 3, 1995) available in WESTLAW, OJ-TRANS.
9. Ron Goldman was also murdered in this case. The focus here is on Nicole Brown
Simpson, however, because she appears to have been the intended victim, and thus a victim
of spousal violence. Goldman, while no less the victim of a murderer, apparently was an
unintended object, slaughtered by happenstance. See infra notes 11-14.
10. Haya EI Nasser, Domestic Conflict Could be Trial's Wild Card/Court Arguments
Begin Today on What Simpson Jury Will Hear, USA TODAY, Jan. 11, 1995, at 8A.
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evidence indicates that women victims of male partner violence are often
later murdered by the same men. II If this happened too to Nicole
Simpson, and her murderer has been acquitted, then Nicole Simpson has
become another vivid symbol of the criminal justice system's failure for
women. 12 We ought not be surprised, then, by the anger of women
regarding this case. 13 It is anger born not of a simple murder case, nor
even of a murder case gone awry, but of a spousal murder case. 14
The element of spousal violence, and the unprecedented familiarity
many observers have with the 0.1. Simpson case, provides a heightened
occasion to examine a relatively unconsidered issue-the perspective that
jurors should assume when evaluating doubt in a criminal case. Can, or
should, a "reasonable woman" concept inform the criminal law's
conception of a "reasonable doubt?" Rather than advocate a definite
answer in this brief essay, I wish simply to open the issue and note some
implications.

I.

The Concept of Reasonable Doubt

The concept of reasonable doubt is reasonably well understood with
regard to the high standard of proof it embodies. But the issue of juror
perspective is unconsidered and full of contradiction in the reasonable
doubt context.

11. "Nearly thirty percent of all women murdered in America are killed by their
husbands or boyfriends . . .. " Susan E. Bernstein, Note, Living Under Siege: Do
Stalking Laws Protect Domestic Violence Victims?, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 525,525 (1993).
'''90% [of these murdered women] had called the police at least once for protection.'" Id.
at 534 (quoting David Holmstrom, Efforts to Protect Women from 'Stalkers' Gain
Momentum at State, Federal Levels, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 22, 1992, at 4). Still
others have been battered but have never registered a recorded call. See BATTERED
WOMEN 14 (Donna M. Moore ed. 1979) (stating that abused wives report "less than 10%"
of batterings). These statistics are surely disturbing even if off by some order of
magnitude. But see Armin Brott, Battered Statistics, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 7, 1994, at
Fl (alleging serious gaps and flaws in the statistics often used in the domestic violence
debate).
12. Weston states this view particularly bitterly: "it was a misogynist and indifferent
culture that allowed 0.1. to batter Nicole for half of her life." Weston, supra note 4, at
230.
13. This is not to suggest that such anger is felt by women only. Many men, too, are
angered by perceived failings of the criminal justice system in this case, including failings
related to spousal violence.
14. Of course, Nicole and 0.1. were no longer married at the time of the killings. That
fact, however, merely emphasizes the horror of spousal violence; separation and divorce
often provide no escape. See Martha R. Mahoney. Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1, 64-65 (1991).
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The idea that a special, high standard for certainty ought to govern
criminal cases "was recurrently expressed from ancient times," 15 and
shares worldwide acceptance. 16 The linguistic formulation for this high
standard as "beyond reasonable doubt" was common at common law, 17
and was adopted as a constitutional requirement of due process in In re
Winship. 18 The phrase is so well known that it seems safe to say that
most Americans-not just lawyers-know it and understand its significance
for criminal trials. Through television, literature, and barroom debate,
"not gUilty until proven beyond a reasonable doubt" has entered the
American psyche. 19
Yet the precise content of the centuries-old concept continues to escape
agreed-upon description. In this, the concept of "beyond a reasonable
doubt" may be like a "prime" number in mathematics: indivisible into
lesser components. Only last year, the U.S. Supreme Court in Victor v.
Nebraska found itself entirely unable to agree on a palatable definition of
"reasonable doubt.,,20 Although the Court left in place a conviction that
rested (in part) upon a definition stating that jurors should feel "an abiding
conviction, to a moral certainty" in order to convict, the Justices were
careful to state unanimously that "we do not condone the use of the
phrase. ,,21 In the course of that decision, the Court noted that Massachusetts Justice Shaw's 1850 definition, which subsequently became the
national standard for defining reasonable doubt, began by pointing out that

15. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE § 321 at 681-682 (1954».
16. See Jon O. Newman, Beyond 'Reasonable Doubt,' 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 979, 982
(1993) (The principle "that an adjudication of gUilt in criminal matters requires a high
degree of certainty" is "widely shared throughout the world's legal systems .... ").
17. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 361; CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 341 (Edward
W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
18. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
19. See generally Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of
Innocence, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 457-58 (1989).
20. Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994) (four separate opinions).
21. Id. at 1245-48. The federal courts generally have rejected the "moral certainty"
definition. See, e.g., United States v. Indorato, 628 F.2d 711, 720-21 (1st Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980). Ironically, while it was the criminal defendant in
Victor who was objecting to the "moral certainty" standard as too low, that standard is
generally disliked by prosecutors, who often find that injection of conceptions of "morality"
into the struggle for certainty sets the standard too high for some jurors to convict. See
Newman, supra note 16, at 983 (moral certainty instruction is "especially favored by
defense attorneys").
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"[ilt is a tenn often used, probably pretty well understood, but not easily
defined. "22
While frowning on "to a moral certainty," the Victor Court also
criticized the use of "strong probabilities" and "substantial doubt" as
linguistic surrogates for reasonable doubt. 23 Three Justices also criticized
a common definitional instruction, the "hesitate to act" allegory. 24
Justices Blackmun and Souter could not approve even the limited
instructions the majority allowed.25 And while Justice Ginsburg endorsed
the Federal Judicial Center's proposed reasonable doubt instruction as
"clear, straightforward, and accurate," her opinion was not joined by any
other Justice. 26 Finally, another common definition of reasonable doubt,
"doubt based on reason" or "for which you can state a reason," is easily
criticized as too high a standard and a linguistic "distortion of the
concept. ,,27 What definition should be given to the concept when all in
use today are so criticized?
If the Supreme Court is divided and cautious about attempting to define
reasonable doubt, the lower courts are even more skeptical. A number of
circuits have opined that trial judges are often better off if they provide no
further definition at all. 28 As Justice Shaw noted 145 years ago, the
phrase by itself is "probably pretty well understood. "29 Even if this

22. Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 320 (1850) quoted in Victor, 114 S. Ct.
at 1244. The pithy accuracy of this statement suggests that Justice Shaw would have made
a fme trial judge in the Simpson case.
23. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1249-51.
24. Justice Ginsburg wrote separately to condemn the "hesitate to act" instruction. Id.
at 1252 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). As given in Victor, the instruction was that
"'[r]easonable doubt' is such a doubt as would cause a reasonable and prudent person, in
one of the graver and more important transactions in life, to pause and hesitate before
taking the represented facts as true and relying and acting thereon." Id. at 1249. But, as
noted by the Federal Judicial Center in commentary to its Pattern Jury Instructions in 1987,
such important decisions "generally involve a very heavy element of uncertainty and risktaking ... wholly unlike the decisions jurors ought to make in criminal cases." Federal
Judicial Center, Pattern Jury Instructions, Instruction 21 in MODERN FEDERAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL: PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS FJC 1, 18-19 (1991) [hereinafter FJC
Instruction 21]. See also Newman, supra note 16, at 982-85.
25. See Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1254 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
26. Id. at 1253 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
27. Newman, supra note 16, at 983.
28. See United States v. Nolasco, 926 F.2d 869, 871-72 (9th CiT. 1991) (en bane)
(collecting cases); e.g., United States v. Lawson, 507 F.2d 433, 442-43 (7th Cir. 1974),
cen. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975).
29. Commonwealth v. Webster. 59 Mass. 295. 320 (1850). Bute[. Newman, supra note
16, at 984-85 (reporting a study of 22 mock trials in which juries hearing a reasonable
doubt instruction convicted more often than juries that heard a "feel sure and certain"
instruction) .
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claim is too strong, it is accurate if amended only slightly by adding "or
at least as well understood as anything else we have come up with. "30
It may be true that "beyond a reasonable doubt" is a concept "pretty
well understood" with regard to the degree of certainty required to convict
in a criminal case. Most everyone understands that "beyond a reasonable
doubt" means not "absolute certainty, ,,31 but yet far more than more
likely than not. "Abiding conviction," "firmly convinced, " so certain that
you would lock someone up for it-we generally get it insofar as the level
of proof is concerned.
B.

DEFINING JURORS' PERSPECTIVE: MUST DovID' BE OBJECTIVELY
REASONABLE OR IDIOSYNCRATICALLY REASONED?

While the near unanimity of advice against further defining the concept
of reasonable doubt certainly gives one pause, the Simpson case nevertheless provides occasion to examine the concept of reasonable doubt from a
different angle. What is the function of "reasonable" in "reasonable
doubt?" Of course it acts as some sort of a qualifier, a "screen" for
doubts, eliminating as a block to conviction silly or fanciful doubts. But
does it also tell anything about the proper perspective of the jurors'
inquiry? Does the concept of "reasonable doubt" contain an assumed
perspective of "an objective, reasonable juror?" Or does reasonable doubt
really mean "idiosyncratic doubt" -a doubt reasonable to a particular
juror, perhaps, yet "unreasonable" to the bulk of objective observers at
large?
This question of appropriate juror perspective-unanswered in any
reasonable doubt instruction I have seen-is not irrelevant in the context
of the Simpson case, even now that the verdict is in. If-and I am
hypothesizing, not asserting-women perceive issues related to domestic
violence differently from men,32 and if resolution of any of those issues
was necessary to accept the prosecution's claim that Nicole Simpson's
domestic batterer subsequently killed her, then a dual-gendered jury ought
to have considered whose perspective (man, woman, "reasonable person")

30. See Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880) ("Attempts to explain the term
'reasonable doubt' do not usually result in making it any clearer to the minds of the
jury. ").
31. It is not absolute because "[t]here are very few things in this world that we know
with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes
every possible doubt." FJC Instruction 21 supra note 24, at FJC 19. See also Victor v.
Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1248 (1994) ("A fanciful doubt is not a reasonable doubt. ").
32. See Kate E. Bloch, A Rape Law Pedagogy, 7 Yale J.L. & Feminism 307, 329
(discussing techniques to "advance a discussion on whether gender differences influence
perceptions of rape"). See also Robin D. Weiner, Note, Shifting the Communication
Burden: A Meaningful Consent Standard in Rape, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.1. 143 (1983)
(regarding potential gender differences in perceiving violent crime). See generally CAROL
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
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the "beyond a reasonable doubt" concept required them to assume as
jurors. Even if the Simpson case provides only a jumping-off point, the
question seems relevant to a deeper understanding of the criminal jury
system in general.
When one reviews the many reasonable doubt definitions in play today
(Victor provides a good survey), they are uniformly silent as to juror
perspective. That is, they say nothing explicit about what perspective,
what persona, a juror ought to adopt when evaluating the evidence in a
criminal case. This is certainly true of the reasonable doubt instruction
actually given in the Simpson trial, which is the standard California
definition:
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows. It is not a mere possible
doubt, because everything relating to human affairs is open to
some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case.
which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the
evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they
cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the
charge. 33
This does not tell jurors anything about deliberative perspective. That is,
it does not say anything like "when evaluating the evidence for doubt, you
should adopt the perspective of the ordinary, reasonable person," versus
something like "you should apply your own subjective ideas of what is
reasonable." An oblique reference to "the minds of the jurors" reminds
us that human minds, not identical computer programs, will be considering
the case. But if "jurors' minds" can differ, then so too may their
perspectives. For all the anxiety about defining the level of certainty, our
reasonable doubt instructions spend no energy at all on guiding twelve
diverse jurors about perspective.
C.

OBJECTIVE VERSUS SUBJECTIVE PERSPECTIVES

Reasonable doubt's silence on perspective seems mildly surpnsIng.
The criminal law is often expressly concerned with perspective; must facts
in a criminal case be considered from a defendant's subjective perspective
or from that of a "reasonable" outsider? "Reasonable" is generally used
in the law to identify an "objective" basis for evaluation, conveying both
a lack of idiosyncratic subjectivity and some sense of majoritarian, or
shared communitarian, values.
The "reasonable man"-now more
appropriately "reasonable person" -is the law's objective "Everyman,"
representing an effort to remove individual variance and irrationality from

33. Court IV: People v. Simpson (Court TV broadcast, Sept. 22, 1995). See
CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL § 2.90 (rev. 5th ed. Supp. July 1995).
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an aspirationally uniform system of societal regulation. "Reasonable"
generally means "leave your personal peccadillos at home," and examine
the situation from some shared perspective. 34
Triers of fact are often expressly instructed to view the evidence from
the perspective of a "reasonable" person when considering other aspects
of the criminal law. For example, the American Law Institute's Model
Penal Code (MPC) instructs jurors to examine mens rea and risk from the
perspective of "a law-abiding person. "35 Some courts have ruled that,
when self-defense is at issue, the perspective of a "reasonable victim"
should be assumed. 36 In contrast, when a non-objective perspective is
desired, the MPC makes it definitionally clear; for example, manslaughter
is defined as murder committed upon "reasonable" provocation, but with
the provocation evaluated "from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's
situation. "37
Thus, evaluative perspective is generally of large concern to drafters
of criminal rules. Yet when we tell jurors to apply the "reasonable doubt"
evaluative standard, we tell them nothing about perspective. Moreover,
it is highly debatable what perspective we want criminal jurors to assume.
Do we intend criminal jurors to apply some objective, majoritarian
perspective in evaluating doubt or to apply their own individualistic,
subjective evaluations? The case law contains conflicting suggestions,38
and the answer seems far from clear. 39

34. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 247 (1978); S. KADISH & S.
SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 461, 479 (5th ed. 1989); W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984) (The
"reasonable man" is "a personification of a community ideal of behavior, determined by
... social judgment. "). See generally Robert Unikel, "Reasonable" Doubts: A Critique
o/the Reasonable Woman Standard in American Jurisprudence, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 326,
328-30 (1992).
35. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) & (d) (American Law Institute, Final Official
Draft 1962) [hereinafter MPC] (defming "recklessly" and "negligently," respectively); id.
§§ 3.05(1)(b), 5.01(1)(a).
36. E.g., People v. Goetz, 111,497 N.E.2d 41, 50 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that
the N.Y. legislature adopted a "reasonable belief" standard for self-defense in order to
require some objective element and not "allow citizens to set their own standards" for when
self-defense is appropriate). See Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the
Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14
LoY. L.A. L. REv., 435, 437, 467-68 (1981) (rejecting a "reasonable woman" standard
in favor of more generalizable language that is "more subjective" and yet permits "the jury
[to] uphold ... community standards").
37. MPC, supra note 35, § 21O.3(1)(b).
38. Compare, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234 (1978) (suggesting that juror
deliberation requires "application of the common sense of the community") with State v.
Robbins, 199 N.E.2d 742, 744 (Ohio 1964) ("Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a
subjective individual standard rather than a group standard. ").
39. Professor Richard Uviller has described a similar tension between "objective" and
"subjective" views of reasonable doubt. Richard Uviller, Acquitting the Guilty: Two Case
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For example, another standard California jury instruction, given to the
Simpson jurors immediately before they retired to deliberate, states that:
The People and the defendant are entitled to the individual opinion
of each juror. Each of you must consider the evidence for the
purpose of reaching a verdict if you can do so. Each of you must
decide the case for yourself, but should do so only after discussing
the evidence and instructions with the other jurors. Do not
hesitate to change an opinion if you are convinced it is wrong.
However, do not decide any question in a particular way because
a majority of the jurors, or any of them, favor such a decision.40
The title of this instruction in the CADIC form book is "Individual
Opinion Required" ;41 it is unconnected to, and does not mention, the
reasonable doubt instruction. Yet it sounds strongly like "idiosyncratic"
doubt, not objectively reasonable doubt.
Indeed, the popular conception of the ideal criminal jury, embodied in
the film "Twelve Angry Men"42 and the heroic hold-out juror, enshrines
"individualistic doubt" as not only the correct perspective but a perspective
vital to implementation of the right to trial by jury in criminal cases. 43
Similarly, at least one common reasonable doubt definition- "doubt for
which you can state a reason,,44-plays directly to an individualistic
perspective. The CALJIC "Individual Opinion" instruction virtually
directs that it is every citizen's "right" to evaluate a criminal case as he or
she sees fit, regardless of the contrary views of other jurors. It could be
argued that "individualistic doubt" is the embodiment of the American
conception of the criminal jury itself. There is nothing "reasonable," in

Studies on Jury Misgivings and the Misunderstood Standard of Proof, 2 CRIM. L.F. 1, 30
(1990). He appears to assert, as the correct view, that a juror's "personal conclusion"
must control. [d. at 31-32. Yet he gives this assertion no analysis and spends the bulk of
his article on levels of certainty rather than juror perspective. [d. at 33-40.
40. Court TV: People v. Simpson (Court TV broadcast, Sept. 29, 1995) (emphasis
added).
41. 2 CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, § 17.40 (5th ed. Supp. July 1995).
42. I am mindful of the irony of this title, in a HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL essay
discussing gender issues. Perhaps this is the appropriate point to note that the law may
well have been untroubled for so long regarding juror perspective because, for the bulk of
common law history, women as well as minorities have been excluded from jury service.
When all jurors are white men, issues of categorical perspective divergence could more
easily remain submerged.
43. An example of the force of this idea is the "jury nullification" movement, which
demands that jurors be informed of their "right" to vote to acquit even against the
evidence, when their individual senses of justice so direct. See Thomas Eagleton, Jury
Nullification: Road to Anarchy, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 30, 1995, at 3B.
44. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
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the sense of majoritarian or objective, about "reasonable doubt" under this
view. 45
Yet a powerful view can run to the contrary. First and foremost, the
very use of the word "reasonable," long used to describe the sort of doubt
that counts in a criminal trial, suggests an objective, non-individualistic
standard.46 Why would "reasonable" be used differently in this legal
context than in others? Some experienced and scholarly thinkers seem also
to suggest this view. For example, in his powerful article, Beyond
"Reasonable Doubt," Judge Jon O. Newman of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit appears to reject the instructional idea "that a doubt
is reasonable . . . if the juror can articulate . . . some particular reason for
it. ,,47 He refers to this as "a distortion" of the reasonable doubt concept;
the proper conception, says Judge Newman, should "prevent a finding of
gUilt unless the evidence dispels those doubts that would be entertained by
the most useful construct of the law-the reasonable person."48 This
conception suggests an objective, communitarian perspective; an idiosyncratic evaluation ought not be the jurors' role. 49
To be fair, the statement I quote is an undeveloped aside in Judge
Newman's comprehensive examination of the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
concept as an appellate evaluative tool; he may not have intended this
implication.
But employing a "reasonable person" perspective for
evaluating doubts in a criminal case would be consistent with the
"communitarian" function of the jury,SO as well as the general demand for
consensus in final criminal jury verdicts. 51
Such a conception of
reasonable doubt also embodies majestic aspirations for the criminal law:
45. "Reasonable" does not lose all function in the individualistic conception, however.
Individual jurors are still informed that a doubt upon which they are inclined to rely must
be "reasoned," not illogical or silly. See FJC Instruction 21, supra note 24.
46. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
47. Newman, supra note 16, at 983.
48. [d. (emphasis added).
49. See also George C. Thomas ill & Barry S. Pollack, Rethinking Guilt, Juries, and
Jeopardy, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1,9 (1992) (suggesting that a correct jury verdict is one that
reflects "the judgment that society as a whole would reach"); Stanton D. Krauss,
Representing the Community: A Look at the Selection Process in Obscenity Cases and
Capital Sentencing, 64 IND. LJ. 617, 641 (1989) (suggesting that jurors in obscenity cases
are "required by law" to "effectuate the 'community's' values").
50. See George C. Harris, The Communitarian Function of the Criminal Jury Trial and
the Rights of the Accused, 74 NEB. L. REv. (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 2-7, on file
with author).
51. That is, verdicts of either conviction or acquittal must be unanimous; overwhelmingly, a criminal verdict is not final if jurors cannot agree. Of course, the Supreme Court
has ruled that non-unanimous criminal jury verdicts can be constitutional. Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 363 (1972). But this even more strongly supports the idea that
reasonable doubt is a communitarian, rather than an individualistic, conception in our
criminal justice system. A minority is not held to delay conviction upon a majority'S view
of reasonableness.
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that it be applied uniformly, with as little disparity as possible. 52 It also
captures the majoritarian nature of criminal law itself, which at bottom
must be representational of the community's shared understanding of
behavioral norms necessary for society to survive. 53 Such a conception
of "reasonable doubt" would require that idiosyncratic perspectives be
abandoned by jurors, in favor of an objective, majoritarian perspective.
Only doubts that are "reasonable" after such a non-subjective evaluation
ought to prevent a finding of guilt.
In this brief essay, rather than further develop these thoughts, I will
merely note that there is a tension regarding theories of juror perspective
when evaluating reasonable doubt: jurors evaluating the evidence from
their own subjective, individualistic perspectives versus jurors who put
aside their own peccadillos in favor of some shared conception of doubts
that are "reasonable." Judge Newman's article expresses (unconsciously,
no doubt) this tension when, immediately after invoking the "reasonable
person" standard for doubt, he describes a criminal jury as "twelve
reasonable persons who form a reasonable jury" and then quotes a
Supreme Court phrasing of the reasonable doubt test as "impressing upon
the fact finder the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude"
regarding guilt. 54 But what are we demanding of each juror: "subjective"
or "objectively reasonable" doubt? None of the instructions we read to
jurors even begin to say. Perhaps this silence reflects our own ambivalence.

II.

Back To the Simpson Case and Its "Reasonable" Jurors

The Simpson jury consisted of ten women and two men. When they
began to deliberate, they had to evaluate powerful evidence from both
sides against tfie "reasonable doubt" standard. Of course, little joint
deliberation apparently was necessary in the Simpson case, because
unanimity was quickly found. 55 This might be explained by lop-sided
52. Uniformity in application of the criminal law can be said to be an aspect of
constitutional due process; if the law does not always achieve uniform application, it at
least ought aspire to it. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,309-10 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that one purpose
of the United States Sentencing Commission is to establish sentencing policies that "avoid[
] unwarranted sentencing disparities").
53. This is perhaps a very different aspect of the Court's statement in Winship that, "use
of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence
of the community .... " Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
54. Newman, supra note 16, at 983-34 (emphasis added) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979». By defming any twelve selected jurors as automatically
"reasonable," this conception neatly avoids the issues I am raising here.
55. This jury has been criticized as not having "deliberated, " because they were together
less than four hours after the nine-month trial concluded. E.g., Today (NBC television
broadcast, Oct. 3, 1995). This criticism seems misdirected, however; the surprise is not
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evidence, sequestration, or the operation of innumerable other factors. But
imagine the case if unanimity had not been immediately achieved. Instead,
the jury is evenly split and lengthy deliberation about the evidence is
necessary. Could the gender of the jurors make a difference? If an
individualistic perspective is appropriate, and "reasonable women" could
disagree with "reasonable men" about domestic violence issues, the answer
would seem to be affirmative. 56
A central fact in the Simpson trial is that (without any doubt) the
defendant had physically abused the victim, his wife, on prior occasions. 57 Photographs of Nicole's previously bruised face and body were
placed before the jury, and Nicole's panicked 911 call during one of
Simpson's attacks ("he's back .... I think you know his record .... ")
was a centerpiece of the prosecutors' case and closing argument. 58 How
should jurors evaluate this fact in deciding how likely it was that Simpson
later came back after Nicole, this time to kill?
One can speculate-and that seems to be the limit of existing data on
the question-that at least some women evaluate evidence of prior domestic
violence differently than do some men. Crystal Weston states her
evaluation clearly; the statistics about wife-battering, she says, "makeO it
very easy and natural for me to believe that 0.1. Simpson murdered
Nicole. "59 The inference is that a man who has beaten his wife is likely
to return to beat her again or kill her. For Weston, and indeed for many
women, this inference is "easy and natural." But perhaps it is not so easy
or natural for some men. It was not for Johnny Cochran, who argued to
the jury that 0.1. Simpson's prior attacks on his wife were irrelevant. 60
Perhaps-and again, this is pure speculation, as permitted only in law

that the jury did not deliberate longer, but that, when it began to deliberate, virtually no
opposed views regarding the force of the evidence apparently were expressed. This is not
a lack of deliberation, but a lack of need for joint deliberation, because unanimity was
speedily achieved. Each juror no doubt had "deliberated" individually, during nine months
of sequestered trial.
56. In a similar vein, Professor Nancy King has argued that "juror race affects jury
decisions in some [criminal] cases." Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury
Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 1993 MICH. L.
REv. 63, 77; see also Deborah L. Forman, What Difference Does it Make? Gender and
Jury Selection, 2 V.C.L.A. WOMEN'S LJ., 35, 48-56 (1992) (arguing more tentatively that
"gender may playa role" in jury deliberations).
57. See People v. Simpson, No. BA0972 11 , 1995 WL 21768 at *1-4 (Cal. Super. Trans.
Jan. 18, 1995) available in WETSLAW, OJ-TRANS.
58. Court TV: People v. Simpson (Court TV broadcast, Sept. 29, 1995).
59. Weston, supra note 4, at 225.
60. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 686429 at *35-40 (Cal. Super. Trans.
Sept. 27,1995) available in WESTLAW, OJ-TRANS. There is irony here, in that Johnny
Cochran has also been accused, by his ex-wife, of spousal violence. See BARBARA
COCHRAN BERRY, LIFE AFrER JOHNNY COCHRAN:
WHY I LEFT THE SWEETESTTALKING, MOST SUCCESSFUL BLACK LAWYER IN L.A. 79-82 (1995).
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journal essays-some men do not want to believe that the incidence of
repeat spousal violence is high or that such episodes are often connected.
Men whose "common sense" runs contrary to Crystal Weston's may then
have a "reasonable doubt" regarding the likelihood that it was 0.1.
Simpson on the night in question, where some "reasonable women" may
have little or no doubt at all.
Reasoning from prior events to the likelihood of later ones is, of
course, inferential and might not have technically been permitted by the
Simpson instructions. 61 But such inferential reasoning is the stuff of
which murder trials are made; murder is the one crime in which the victim
is never available to give an eye-witness account. Thus the Simpson case
was entirely "circumstantial" in this regard, and jurors were asked to
divine "facts" that no one (other than possibly the defendant) could
"know" absolutely. Juror perspective can be essential in determining the
course of such an exercise; in this case, application of a "reasonable
woman" standard for jurors applying the reasonable doubt standard might
have made a difference. 62
Perhaps the anger of women scholars about this trial reflects an
underlying perspectival difference powerful enough to alter perceptions of
reasonable doubt. Catherine MacKinnon has argued that the law's
purported objectivity-reasonableness-is in fact male oriented and that
such a gender-biased view ought to be purged. 63 If women react
"reasonably," and yet differently than men, to domestic violence, may
their different perspectives be permitted to control their jury deliberations?
Further, if a purely individualistic juror perspective is permitted, then may
parties in a criminal case seek to introduce evidence about the "reasonable
woman's" perspective in order to assist male jurors in understanding

61. The evidence of O.J. Simpson's prior domestic violence was admitted for purposes
of showing intent and motive only. See supra note 57. In his closing instructions to the
jury, Judge Ito instructed that that evidence could not be used for any other purpose.
People v. Simpson, No. BA0972 11 , 1995 WL 672668 at *9 (Cal. Super. Trans. Sept. 22,
1995) available in WESTLAW, OJ-TRANS.
62. Cf. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-80 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying a "reasonable
woman" standard in sexual harassment cases under 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-2(a)(1»; State v.
Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 558-59 (Wash. 1977) (murder conviction of female defendant
reversed because instructions suggested a "reasonable male" standard, rather than
reasonable woman); Rachel A. Van Cleave, A Matter of Evidence or Law? Battered
Women Claiming SelfDefense in California, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 217 (1994); Deborrah
Ann Klis, Reforms to Criminal Defense Instructions: New Patterned Jury Instructions
Which Account for the Experience of the Battered Woman Mw Kills her Battering Mate,
24 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 131 (1994) (California self-defense doctrine and the
"battered woman syndrome").
63. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 162-63,
248-49 (1989). Accord Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable
Woman, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv., 769, 770-80.
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women's perspective once deliberations begin?64 Such an expansion of
the use of expert testimony would be revolutionary in practice; yet
evidence rules comprehend admission of expert testimony that "will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence. "65
Thus opening the question of permissible juror perspective is unsettling
in many directions. One shudders to imagine the possibilities if jurors are
expressly told that "reasonable doubt" means-and means only- "any
doubt you find convincing," no matter how idiosyncratic or uniformly
rejected it might be by fellow jurors or society in general. Yet no less
revolutionary would be an express direction to jurors that they should
abandon even their firmly held doubts if they conclude the majority does
not view them as "reasonable." Neither extreme seems right; "reasonable
doubt" has components of individuality as well as communitarian assent.
The Simpson jurors were told nothing about perspective, other than to
"decide the case for yourself. "66 Does "reasonable doubt" in fact mean
"idiosyncratic doubt" in criminal cases? The law currently does not
answer the question, and points, somewhat sheepishly, in both directions.
Perhaps this silence is golden. Nevertheless, this case provides a special
opportunity to further refine our thinking about the conception of
reasonable doubt and the proper role of jurors. Such rethinking ought to
be cause for celebration, in the otherwise joyless wake of the 0.1. Simpson
trial.

64. See generally Rick Brown, Limitations on Expert Testimony on the Battered Woman
Syndrome in Homicide Cases: The Return of the Ultimate Issue Rule, 32 ARIZ. L. REv.
665 (1990).
65. FED. R. EVID. 702.
66. See supra note 40.

